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Abstract We introduce Microsoft’s Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB),
and present a novel metaphor to describe it. An existing software application
providing electronic legal document services is discussed, and results of a se-
curity analysis presented. The existing software architecture is extended with
NGSCB to solve some noted security vulnerabilities. The novel architecture is
then analysed for its successes and shortcomings.
1. Introduction
Microsoft is being watched with considerable interest as they continue to
promoteanddeveloptheirNext-GenerationSecureComputingBase, alongside
other industry heavyweights developing trusted computing platforms [Group,
2003]. Commentators are weighing in, with both technical [Spinellis, 2003]
and philosophical [Stallman, 2002] arguments against the innovations being
promoted by the Trusted Computing Group.
Whilst the debate surrounding the various philosophical and technical im-
plications of NGSCB, and trusted computing as a whole, is being ﬁercely con-
ducted, little has been said or done about its possible uses when integrated with
existing applications.
It is expected by the authors that NGSCB will ﬁrst appear in commercial
desktops. This prediction is made based on the observation that the beneﬁts
of NGSCB will appeal most strongly to businesses that have an interest in
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Conversely, it is also expected by the authors that NGSCB will ﬁnd resis-
tance in the home market. The same features that allow a company to secure
its data and operations from an attack can be used to remove existing privi-
leges that home users have with digital content. A home environment with an
NGSCB-enabled system would enable content providers to implement pow-
erful DRM systems, allowing secure end-to-end digital media delivery to the
home [Brendan, 2001].
Previous attempts at securing digital content in a hostile environment have
failed, and researchers attempting to secure software from modiﬁcation or
unauthorised duplication have stated that a successful solution without a hard-
ware component is not possible [Martin and Marsden, 2003]. Microsoft will
make use of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [Group, 2003] designed by
the Trusted Computing Group, manufactured and provided by hardware ven-
dors, including AMD [Strongin, 2003], to ﬁll the role of this hardware compo-
nent.
This paper presents a case study investigating the application of NGSCB
to an existing software application. For NGSCB to prove useful to software
developers with an existing product, it should be able to be integrated into an
existing architecture without requiring extensive modiﬁcations. Indeed, if the
modiﬁcations required to integrate NGSCB necessitated signiﬁcant changes to
the code base, it may be more cost effective for a development team to design
and implement their own security enhancements, as opposed to using the more
general toolset provided by NGSCB.
TheapplicationchosenforthiscasestudywasElectronicLegal(ELF)Forms
[Forms, 2003], aproductoftheAucklandDistrictLawSociety(ADLS)[ADLS,
2003]. The Electronic Legal Forms application allows lawyers to work with
electronic versions of pre-prepared legal documents. The Auckland District
LawSociety’shard-copylegalformproductsprovidelawﬁrmsinNewZealand
with standardised, well-known documents to assist them in various legal trans-
actions. It should be noted that the architecture described in this case study
requires all involved parties to have NGSCB-enabled platforms.
Thispaperisorganisedasfollows. ThesecondsectionwillintroduceNGSCB,
illustrating some features and describing its operation through use of a novel
metaphor. The third section will describe the Electronic Legal Forms soft-
ware. Its purpose, features and security vulnerabilities and the security goals
of integration with NGSCB will be outlined. The fourth section presents an
integrated architecture, and illustrates possible uses of NGSCB. Section ﬁve
contains discussion of the success and shortcomings of the NGSCB integra-
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2. Microsoft’s NGSCB
A detailed analysis of the Next-Generation Secure Computing Base is out-
side the scope of this paper. A good introduction to NGSCB can be found on
Microsoft’s NGSCB webpage [Microsoft, 2003b].
2.1 Novel Security Primitives
NGSCB provides four new security primitives to Windows application de-
velopers, through a number of hardware modiﬁcations described in [Microsoft,
2003a] by Microsoft. These four new security primitives are sealed storage, se-
cure IO, strong process isolation and attestation.
Attestation is the most novel of these four security primitives. It allows
the security boundary from a nexus computing agent (NCA) running on one
machine to extend to and include that of another NCA running on another ma-
chine, with communication taking place over an insecure channel such as the
Internet. Further explanation of attestation, and nexus computing agents, can
be found in section 2.2. This allows applications to trust a remote application
to perform in a correct manner, despite it being located on a machine adminis-
tered by possibly malicious users. Using this base, policy projection from one
computer to another can occur, enabling Digital Rights Management (DRM)
style applications to be built.
It is described as the most novel, because of all four new security primi-
tives provided by NGSCB, it alone enables a new class of secure application
to be built. Sealed storage simply advances upon features that come from ﬁle
systems with access control, but shifts authorisation from being user-based to
program-based. Secure input and output are novel features, but do not allow
new applications to be built until secure peripherals, other than video, mouse,
and keyboard become available. Additionally, there are already a number of
software-only methods available to prevent screen scraping in Microsoft Win-
dows. Strong process isolation merely provides in hardware what has been
provided in some degree by operating systems for a number of years. Whilst it
makes virtual memory protection much more secure, most current applications
are written on the assumption that their memory address range is protected
from other programs.
Attestation, however, allows remote cryptographic veriﬁcation of not only
the executing program but also the call stack, all the way down to the hardware
level. This is a powerful new security primitive, creating new levels of assur-
ance for computations performed by remote computers, and allowing admin-
istrators to project policy to remote platforms. Attestation is described in var-
ious levels of detail by England et al and in the various white papers [Trusted
Computing Group, 2003, England et al., 2003, Microsoft, 2003d] published
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(TPM), along with various cryptographic certiﬁcates, to prove that a speciﬁc
hardware and software stack is NGSCB-enabled, and can be trusted to operate
as expected.
2.2 A Hierarchy of Trust
Figure 1. A Three-Layer Hierachy
Without a strong technical understanding of NGSCB, it can be difﬁcult to
imagine how the system will operate when in widespread use. As is often the
case with technical subjects, it is useful to develop a metaphor for the NGSCB
system. The NGSCB environment that runs inside a single machine can be
thought of as a hierarchy of three enforcement agents. The enforcement agents
running inside a system have differing levels of authority. They are identi-
ﬁed by their badge numbers, which are generated for each agent, by the agent
directly above it in the hierarchy.
The badge number can be thought of as a code ID or manifest. This is a
hash of the binary executable of the program. The TPM hardware chip can
be thought of as a police ofﬁcer; an executing nexus can be thought of as a
security guard; an executing NCA can be thought of as an ordinary citizen.
This three-layer hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 1.
The nexus is the trusted kernel that hosts those programs speciﬁcally writ-
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nexus computing agents (NCAs), and run separately from both other NCAs
and normal programs.
The police ofﬁcer can be trusted to enforce the operating restrictions of
NGSCB as it is ﬁxed in hardware. The police ofﬁcer’s validity is proven by
the certiﬁcate of the manufacturer, which it can provide upon request. This
certiﬁcate attests that it has been built to an approved, published standard.
The police ofﬁcer, or TPM, will allow any security guard, or nexus, to run
on the platform. The police ofﬁcer can be guaranteed to provide, when asked,
the correct badge number of the security guard, which can be used to ensure
that the security guard is who he claims to be. In turn, the security guard will
attest to the identity of any citizen, or NCA, it is watching or hosting.
When using the seal primitive, the three identities of the police ofﬁcer, secu-
rity guard, and citizen work together. In the common case, of a citizen sealing
secrets to itself for later use, their unique identities ensure that the data can
only be unsealed when the same police ofﬁcer, security guard, and citizen are
present. This means the data cannot be unsealed on a different NGSCB plat-
form, where the police ofﬁcer, or TPM, differs. It also means that the security
guard and citizen will be the same executing binaries when the data was sealed,
as when it is unsealed.
Despite the open nature of the NGSCB system, that according to Microsoft
will allow anyone to write a nexus and NCA themselves [Grawrock, 2003], this
hierarchy of identities will remove some of the freedom of choice that may ini-
tially appear to be present. Users must run security guards whose identities
are known by the parties to whom they are attesting. This can be easily illus-
trated by describing a current application that could make use of attestation —
securing online banking — described in [Microsoft, 2003d].
The bank server, running under a known police ofﬁcer and a known security
guard, receives the attestation vector from the remote client bank application.
The vector contains the identity of the application, or citizen, as well as the
identity of the security guard under which it is running. These identities are
certiﬁed by the signature of the police ofﬁcer, who is implemented in hardware
and is considered trusted by all parties. An alternative is that the two identities
are certiﬁed by a third party, who is trusted by the bank to only issue certiﬁca-
tions to NGSCB platforms — this process allows some degree of anonymity.
The bank server will only communicate with the remote application if both the
identities of the security guard and the application are as expected.
In effect, NGSCB places a police ofﬁcer inside the current PC architecture
that can be trusted to ensure that the operation of any security guard or citizen
is assured, and cannot be modiﬁed during execution. The end user is in full
control over what security guards and citizens are allowed to run on their sys-
tem, and what information the various entities can reveal. However, in order to
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nication, a speciﬁc security guard, or nexus, must be running under the police
ofﬁcer. No details are available as to how many nexus will be made avail-
able for use. It is expected that a Microsoft-written nexus will be distributed,
and used by default. It will be this security guard that citizens (provided by
software vendors) will need to run under, in order to be identiﬁed correctly.
3. Electronic Legal Forms
3.1 Business Usage
The Auckland District Law Society’s Electronic Legal Forms application is
intended for use by lawyers and legal professionals to prepare legal forms for
use in a variety of transactions. The product was developed seven years ago
to allow law ofﬁces to move away from the dated practice of legal secretaries
working with manual typewriters, ﬁlling in the various ﬁelds of a hard-copy
legal form template. The user is able to work with an electronic version of
the template, ﬁlling in the required ﬁelds and removing clauses that are not
required for a speciﬁc document. By moving to an electronic format, forms
can be partially completed, returned to later, and then ﬁnalised before printing
and signing by the client.
3.2 ELF Features
In the current implementation, electronic stock is stored on a hardware don-
gle attached to the user’s computer, or in the case of larger ﬁrms on a network
server. This dongle is referred to as a Software Authentication Button (SAB).
The Electronic Legal Forms application connects to the SAB whenever a ﬁnal
copy of the document is printed. The software ensures that sufﬁcient reserves
of stock are present on the SAB. The stock is decremented by the appropri-
ate amount, and the legal form is printed. This process allows collection of
revenue by the ADLS.
The Electronic Legal Forms package allows users of the software to send
under-revision, or ﬁnalised, copies of documents to each other. The editing
process is conducted through a GUI, shown in Figure 2. User-modiﬁable ﬁelds
are shown in grey, and boilerplate legalese is viewable as black-on-white text.
After creating or editing a legal form, users simply transmit a string, ob-
tained from ELF, which encodes only the ﬁelds that contain user-modiﬁable
text, through e-mail to the other party. There, the encoded string is inserted
into Electronic Legal Forms. For example, the name and address of one party
can be entered by their lawyer, after which the document can be sent to the
lawyer of another party, who can update the required ﬁelds with their own
client’s name and address. Once the legal form has been ﬁnalised to all par-
ties’ satisfaction, the form is marked as such. After this point in time, ELF noElectronic Legal Forms 7
Figure 2. Electronic Legal Forms interface
longer allows modiﬁcation to the user-modiﬁable ﬁelds. This process requires
a copy of Electronic Legal Forms at both ends of the communication, as the in-
formation that makes up the body of the legal form — information that should
be a facsimile across all versions of that legal form — is not transmitted.
3.3 Security Goals
The implementation described above illustrates an important design goal of
Electronic Legal Forms. The exactwording and formatting of alegal document
is of the utmost importance.8 Using NGSCB to Mitigate Existing Software Threats
EMAILING ELECTRONIC LEGAL
FORMS
Many users have asked whether it is possible to email a legal
form to a non Legal Forms user. The answer is yes, but for secu-
rity reasons the facility is not included within the package.
If you have access to the full version of Adobe Acrobat, or a
simple PDF printer driver, then all you need to do is change your
default printer in Legal Forms to use this instead, and print the
ﬁle as normal. A PDF version of your ﬁle will be created, and
can be emailed to anyone. Please note that by default, there is
no security on a PDF ﬁle, this means that with access to the full
version of Acrobat the content of the PDF can be altered, which
in this case could possibly be the clauses within a form. The
amended ﬁle can then be re-saved with the alterations intact.
For ADLS it is paramount that any forms distributed between
law ﬁrms are as complete as when they were ﬁrst printed. This
ensures that you, the lawyer, can be conﬁdent that a particular
word of a particular clause will always appear in the same place
on the same page each and every time. Being able to guarantee
this reduces the need to carefully re-read the clauses on forms
that may be printed or received from other lawyers, unless abso-
lutely necessary.
Unfortunately with there being no default security on a PDF ﬁle,
ADLS can no longer guarantee that this is going to be the case.
It is therefore essential that if anyone wishes to create a PDF
version of the form using one of these methods, that they inde-
pendently set the security passwords on each form that is pro-
duced. This will prevent any potential conﬂicts that may arise
over a form being signed that could otherwise differ from that
originally generated. Setting the security options will prevent
any unauthorised access to the content of the form, and therefore
once again ensure that the content is accurate.
It must be stressed though that the setting of the security is up
to each individual who generates a PDF version of a form from
within Legal Forms, and ADLS are not responsible for the con-
tent of the form once it leaves the package in PDF format.
Figure 3. Instructions to ELF users taken from August 2003 Auckland District Law Society
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Legal forms that include the Auckland District Law Society letterhead are
widelyacceptedamongstlawyersasbeingcorrectreplications, andarefavoured
because they do not require proof reading at each use. The Auckland District
Law Society guarantees the veracity of their legal forms supplied in hard copy
format, and of ﬁnal copies that are printed directly from the Electronic Legal
Forms package.
This is one of the primary goals of the ADLS, and can be found in their
own words in paragraph 4 of Figure 3. From this, a security goal that users
of ELF, after NGSCB integration, are able to transmit documents in a format
whose veracity can be guaranteed by the ADLS is derived. This is deﬁned as
G1 in table Table 1. This is a goal of the (non-malicious) lawyers who use ELF
(hereafter referred to as primary users). It is also a goal of the (non-malicious)
secondary users, deﬁned as those with whom a primary user communicates but
does not have an ELF installation. It is not strictly a goal of the ADLS, but due
to interest in their clients’ satisfaction, may be considered one.
The ADLS also requires the payment of an appropriate fee for each legal
form that is printed. Again, the implementation described in section 3.2 allows
the ADLS to collect the appropriate fees for each printed hard copy of a legal
form. This is deﬁned as G2 in Table 1. This goal is only pertinent to the ADLS,
as primary or secondary users of ELF are not strictly concerned that revenue is
collected for each print.
The Auckland District Law Society recently noted an increase in requests
from clients to be able to email copies of legal forms to users who do not have
ELF. This issue was addressed in an August 2003 newsletter, the relevant parts
of which are reproduced in Figure 3. The ADLS is concerned that PDF is
seen by many as a way to send a high quality document that cannot be easily
modiﬁed to others. These requests lead the ADLS to look for a document
format that can be transmitted like a PDF, yet retain goals G1 and G2. This
goal is deﬁned as G3, in Table 1. This is a goal of both primary and secondary
users of ELF as it allows them to communicate. Again, this is not strictly a
goal of the ADLS, but for the same reasons as G1, may be considered one.
Currently, printing to PDF from Electronic Legal Forms is possible using
standard PDF printer drivers. Paragraph 2 of Figure 3 instructs ELF users how
they may print to the PDF format. Paragraph 3 points out to users that there
is no default security in a PDF ﬁle. Despite user education, the Auckland
District Law Society is concerned that its users may enjoy a false sense of
security regarding the static nature of a document printed to PDF. Without the
appropriate security restrictions put in place at the time of authoring, a PDF
can be modiﬁed with ease. The Auckland District Law Society is aware of
this, and is not willing to provide the same guarantees to a document’s veracity
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4 and 5 of Figure 3 show that ADLS strongly deprecate the use of PDF to
transmit legal forms.
An additional security concern, inherent in electronic communication, is the
ease with which a conﬁdential legal document can be sent via e-mail to unau-
thorised parties. Working with only hard copies of legal documents severely
restricts the distribution of highly conﬁdential information to unauthorised par-
ties, both by accident and through malice. If the use of PDF to store and trans-
port legal documents via email increases, mistaken or malicious transmission
to unauthorised third parties will also increase. It is viewed as highly beneﬁ-
cial by the ADLS [Martin and Marsden, 2003] to be able to impart DRM-style
viewing restrictions to an authored document. Ideally, a closed set of relevant
parties could be added to a legal document, with other parties unable to view
the document. This is deﬁned as G4 in Table 1. This is a goal of both the pri-
mary and secondary users of ELF. Again, it is not strictly a goal of the ADLS,
but due to interest in their clients’ satisfaction, may be considered one.
It is worth drawing comparisons between the security goals outlined in Ta-
ble 1, obtained by analysis of ELF, and Pﬂeeger’s [Pﬂeeger, 1997] three arms
ofcomputersecurity: conﬁdentiality, integrity, andavailability(CIA).GoalG1
maps directly to the integrity of the legal form. Goal G2 is a special case of
Pﬂeeger’savailability—arestrictedDRM-styleavailability. GoalG3isastan-
dard availability goal. Goal G4 is a conﬁdentiality goal. This CIA mnemonic
will be used in section 5.1 to draw conclusions about the success or failure of
the proposed architecture to satisfy the stated security goals.
3.4 Security Threats
In the current ELF architecture, certain threats to the deﬁned security goals
arise due to an ability to print to the PDF format from within Electronic Legal
Forms. Additionally, a number of threats arise from the manner in which a
legal form is transmitted between two users of ELF, as described in 3.2 above.
It is possible to prevent the installation of printer drivers on an administered
Windows machine, and thus restrict the ability to print to PDF from Electronic
Legal Forms through a PDF printer driver. However, this form of restriction is
not possible when the program is installed on machines not under the adminis-
tration of the Auckland District Law Society.
A PDF document can be re-printed without any limitations by anyone who
obtains it. As described previously, the transferral to hard copy of an electronic
legal form is a considerable and important source of revenue for the Auckland
District Law Society. The ease of printing to PDF from Electronic Legal Forms
allows two paths for violation of G2 (Table 1).
The ﬁrst is the casual printing of a legal form that has been sent to a sec-
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the document through other channels. They are able to print a copy for them-
selves, indistinguishable from a copy printed directly from Electronic Legal
Forms for which revenue was collected. The print operation occurs outside
the control of an ELF installation, resulting in inability collect revenue for the
print. This is noted as T1 in Table 1. A print operation is considered controlled
if the appropriate fee is paid at some point.
The second comes from the removal of the personalised text, such as names
and addresses, from the PDF. This process, performed only once, creates a
blank template. This template can be used to avoid the need to purchase legal
forms from the Auckland District Law Society. This threat is noted as T2 in
Table 1. This threat comes from primary and secondary users, as well as from
malicious third parties.
In addition to allowing printing without restriction, a standard PDF ﬁle also
allows modiﬁcation of the document itself. This opens the document up to
threats T3 (modiﬁcation of the legalese boilerplate, as deﬁned in section 3.2),
and T4 (modiﬁcation of the user-modiﬁable ﬁelds). These threats come from a
malicious third party who is able to intercept, modify and re-inject the doc-
ument on its way from a primary to a secondary user through an insecure
channel. Additionally, primary and secondary users are able to modify the
document, calling into question the accuracy of both parties’ copies.
In comparison, transmission between two or more users of ELF (section
3.2), where the legal form is never printed to PDF, results in only T4 able to
occur. In this situation, only primary users are involved in the transmission
of the legal form. In fact, it should be noted that if a form is never printed
to PDF threats T1 and T2 can not occur. However, as previously mentioned,
it is impossible to prevent a legal form from being printed to PDF. This issue
is addressed in section 5.1. It is possible, however, for the string transmitted
between two primary users across an insecure channel to be modiﬁed by a
malicious third party able to intercept, modify and reinject it. This is noted as
T4 in Table 1.
4. Integrated Design
To make full use of the security that can be implemented with NGSCB,
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) built around NGSCB is proposed. Then
an NGSCB-enabled legal form viewer that allows controlled distribution of
legal forms is described. Finally, a simple architecture for allowing controlled
remote printing to occur is described.
4.1 PKI and Attestation
Many of the weaknesses of a PKI come from being unable to control the
enrolment of parties into the scheme, and being unable to verify their identi-12 Using NGSCB to Mitigate Existing Software Threats
GOALS
Description Goal Of
G1 “...a particular word of a particular
clause will always appear in the same
place on the same page...”
Non-malicious primary and secondary
users
G2 Every print operation of a legal form is
controlled by the ADLS, allowing col-
lection of the appropriate revenue
ADLS
G3 A legal form can be viewed on a com-
puter without an ELF installation.
Primary user, secondary user
G4 A legal form can only be read by the in-
tended recipients(s)
Non-malicious primary and secondary
users
THREATS
Description Threat From
T1 Uncontrolled printing of a ﬁnalised form Primary and secondary users, and third
parties
T2 Creation of an electronic template of a
legal form
Primary and secondary users, and third
parties
T3 Modiﬁcation of the legalese boilerplate
on a legal form.
Malicious third parties, and malicious
primary and secondary parties
T4 Modiﬁcation of the user-modiﬁable
ﬁelds on a legal form
Malicious third parties, and malicious
primary and secondary parties.
Table 1. Security goals and threats of ELFIntegrated Design 13
ties when doing so. With Electronic Legal Forms, administered enrolment is
possible when a copy of the software is purchased and installed by a law ﬁrm.
When discussing the new design of the ELF architecture it will be referred to
as New ELF (NELF).
The root of trust is a master server Lf, or certiﬁcate authority, administered
by the Auckland District Law Society. The installation procedure of a copy
of NELF at a primary user’s site involves the generation of a public/private
key pair, ki/k0
i. This key pair is for the sole intended use of participating in
the ADLS controlled PKI. The private key is stored, using the NGSCB seal
primitive [Microsoft, 2003d], on the local computer, Clocal.
Once this is done, the newly installed copy of NELF contacts the ADLS
server. The procedure for establishing a trust relationship between two NCAs
on different computers is described in the Microsoft white paper concerning
software authentication [Microsoft, 2003c]. In this situation, the two NCAs
in question are the ADLS administered NGSCB-enabled ADLS server, and
newly installed NELF NCA on the primary user’s computer.
One difﬁculty with automatically creating a trust relationship between a
NELF installation and the ADLS server is establishing network communica-
tion in heterogeneous corporate environments. A secure communication is re-
quired between the two parties who are expected to be located behind various
layers of network and application security. It is feasible to perform the re-
quired communication over the HTTPS protocol — which is widely available
on corporate desktops, and allowed through corporate ﬁrewalls.
An initial communication takes place, most likely over HTTPS. The HTTPS
protocol ensures the integrity of the communication, and the conﬁdentiality.
The primary user, through checking the server’s PKI certiﬁcate, will authen-
ticate the server. For this communication, the previously generated public
key, ki, is attested by the nexus running on the primary user’s computer. It
is then transmitted, along with other cryptographic information used to verify
the NGSCB platform itself and the NELF installation program to the ADLS
server. This extra information is used to verify that the NCAs that are com-
municating with each other can be trusted to operate as expected, i.e. they are
executing on a valid NGSCB platform, as described previously in section 2.1
above.
The ADLS server signs a certiﬁcate, Ck, identifying the public key, along
with information concerning the primary user itself, Ai, most likely a contact
address or other information of interest to users. This certiﬁcate is returned to
the NCA at the primary user’s site. In order for identiﬁcation to be established
in both directions, the process is repeated, with the two NCAs reversing their
roles. Once this process has been completed for the primary user, it is consid-
ered enrolled into the ADLS PKI. This protocol is outlined more succinctly in
Table 2, as PKI Enrolment and Attestation.14 Using NGSCB to Mitigate Existing Software Threats
The NELF application is modiﬁed to present the identities of other primary
users, Ax, who are enrolled into the PKI, when preparing a legal form for elec-
tronic transmission. This directory listing would be retrieved from the ADLS
server when the primary user’s NELF installation ﬁrst enrols into the PKI, and
periodically thereafter, to maintain a fresh listing. A legal form would then
be encrypted with the published public key(s), kx, of the respective primary
user(s), Ax, to which it addressed.
Due to the forced enrolment during installation, and the inclusion of suit-
able identiﬁcation information, future communications are able to take place
between law ﬁrms in conﬁdence. Revocation is controlled by the ADLS. Reg-
ular updates by primary users of their local certiﬁcate stores will reduce the
likelihood of a compromised key continuing to be trusted.
4.2 Widget
Further integration of NGSCB with NELF occurs through the development
of a widget, similar in functionality and use to Adobe’s Acrobat Reader. This
widget re-uses the internal document format and existing form editor of Elec-
tronic Legal Forms as shown in Figure 2.
As described previously, the current version of Electronic Legal Forms al-
lows two users of the product to transfer under-revision or ﬁnalised legal forms
between themselves. This functionality would not be removed when integrated
with NGSCB, but would be restricted in order to address G4 — preventing
viewing of a legal form by unauthorised parties — with a PKI as described in
section 4.1.
4.3 Lightweight DRM Wrapper
Currently, when a user wishes to send a legal form by email to a client they
print the form to PDF, which is then emailed to the client. Under the new
architecture, this process is still the same. However, instead of a PDF being
generated, an encrypted version of the legal form is generated. This legal form
can only be viewed with the NELF widget.
This NCA widget has a limited set of functions, and can enforce a number
of restrictions, such as an inability to print the form. It is similar in appearance
and usability to the document viewing and editing component of Electronic
Legal Forms.
In order to ensure the conﬁdentiality of the transmitted document (G3) addi-
tional trust relationships must be established. A trust relationship is established
between a primary user (a law ﬁrm), Lf that uses NELF and any secondary
users (clients), Cl1−n, to whom a legal document needed to be distributed.
This would take a similar form as between the PKI rooted at the ADLS admin-
istration server, and primary users using ELF.Integrated Design 15
PKI Enrolment and Attestation
1 Root of trust created on ADLS administered server Lf. Public/private key paid j/j
0 gener-
ated.
2 Installation of NELF at law ﬁrm. Public/private key pair k/k
0 generated, and stored on
Clocal with NGSCB seal command.
3 New NELF install contacts ADLS server over HTTPS. Clocal nexus attests to k, Lf nexus
attests to j.
4 Lf signs certiﬁcate Ckn, including Akn and k. Ak contains enough information to
uniquely identify the law ﬁrm, most likely with name and addresses.
5 Ckn returned to Clocal along with all other Ck certiﬁcates created for other law ﬁrms.
Message Transmission
1 User picks certiﬁcate Ck of intended recipient from list presented, using Ak to identify
them.
2 Legal form is encrypted with public key Ck, and emailed to electronic address speciﬁed in
Ak.
Table 2. Protocol Steps
The widget installation ﬁle from the primary user’s NELF computer is dis-
tributed to the client. The client, C1, upon reception through email of the
widget from a trusted party — namely their law ﬁrm Lf, simply executes it.
It is expected that local user interaction and authorization will be required to
allow an NCA to execute on a computer. The exact manner in which this will
occur has not yet been ﬁnalised by Microsoft. Additionally, NCAs are likely
[Cram and Kaplan, 2003] to execute in a sandboxed environment, with a user-
customisable set of restrictions placed upon them.
Once the user authorises the execution of the widget, a trust relationship
must be formed between the secondary and primary users. The secondary
user’s NELF widget installation generates a public/private key pair, k/k0. The
public key k of this pair is presented in an emailtransmittable form to the user.
It is then emailed to the primary user Lf, which records the public key in their
local ELF system. This process could easily be automated, so to appear trans-
parent to the primary and secondary users. No trust relationship is established
in the reverse direction, as none is required. The NELF viewer widget serves
only to display the documents; it does not allow any editing or formatting to
take place.
At this point, the widget has been installed, and the newly generated public
key returned to Lf. The main NELF installation at Lf can then send legal
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Documents are prepared for sending to secondary users with the installed
widget, just as a form is currently prepared for printing to PDF. A primary
user can create a copy of the legal document encrypted for the relevant sec-
ondary user. The NELF program would present a list of known widgets that
have been distributed and installed. A primary user can select the secondary
users to whom they want to distribute the document. The document would be
encrypted, and the primary user would simply email the ﬁle to the secondary
user. There, the preinstalled NCA widget would be used to display the docu-
ment securely.
This procedure illustrates the ability to create a secure, one-way trust rela-
tionship between two NGSCB platforms without the need for a hierarchical
PKI that is created by attestation. Once again, however, the NGSCB platform
veriﬁes the NCA has not been modiﬁed, and can be trusted to maintain the
policies applied to any legal documents sent to it.
The architecture described here presumes all parties involved have NGSCB
platforms upon which to execute the NCAs. This is a major shortcoming, and
is noted in section 5.2.
This architecture illustrates the use of NGSCB to project policy restrictions
onto a remote computer to protect an electronic document. It can be seen as a
lightweight DRM application, capable of protecting high value documents, the
integrity of which both parties have an interest in.
4.4 Printing and Replay Attacks
The design is further extended to allow G2 (the collection of revenue for
all printed legal forms) to occur at secondary users’ sites, as well as primary
users’.
The secondary user is able to print a restricted number of copies of the
legal form under certain conditions. When a document is being prepared for
transmission to a secondary user, a certain number of print credits must be
attached to the document by the primary user, if the secondary user is to print
that document. The ADLS collects revenue for these credited prints from the
NELF primary user’s account. The primary user can collect the cost of these
prints from their secondary user through their regular accounting channels with
that user. When the document is viewed by the widget, the print credits allow
the secondary user a set number of prints. When a copy is printed, the credits
are decremented, and the document securely updated with the new value.
This method of enabling remote pay-per-print is vulnerable to a form of
replay attack. A secondary user who receives a document that contains a cer-
tain number of print credits may simply exhaust those credits, then replace the
exhausted copy with the document they were originally sent.Discussion 17
A solution to this attack is to force the widget to contact a server, run by
the primary user that distributed the document, in order to verify every print
command. There are a number of problems with this solution.
Firstly, a primary user may not want, or have the capability, to maintain a
permanent presence on the Internet. Secondly, even if each primary user pro-
vided such a server, each print operation would require a network connection
to the server, which may not be possible for a number of reasons. An ideal
solution would have some form of ofﬂine printing capability, as well as still
ensuring that G2 is maintained.
In the system described, the NCA widget is able to store some uniquely
identifying attribute of any document for which it generates a printed copy in
its conﬁguration set. Future attempts to print the same ﬁle will be caught by
matching the unique attribute previously stored. It can be seen that this merely
shifts the target of any attempted replay attack. Now, the conﬁguration set,
which has data concerning the number of times a certain document has been
printed, is simply replaced with an earlier copy.
DiscussionswithmembersoftheNGSCBdevelopmentteam[RayandCram,
2003] regarding this problem revealed a number of solutions under develop-
ment. One interesting idea was the development of an encrypted NGSCB reg-
istry, which NCAs could use to store persistent state. If this was modiﬁed or
deleted, the NGSCB platform itself could be engineered to stop working, pre-
venting further access to the legal documents. In addition, counters such as
those required by the NELF widget could be stored in multiple places, increas-
ing the difﬁculty of simply replacing them with earlier values. While these
solutions would not make the described replay attack impossible, it would in-
crease the difﬁculty of such an attack.
5. Discussion
5.1 Satisfaction of Goals
In order to ascertain the success, or otherwise, of the NELF design after
integration with NGSCB, we can review the original security goals as deﬁned
in Table 1.
Goal G1, concerned with the integrity of a legal form, is assured with pub-
lic key encryption. All legal forms are encrypted with the public key of their
intended recipients before transmission. The goal is met for all concerned par-
ties: the ADLS, and primary and secondary users. Integrity is assured through
the cryptographic strength of the underlying encryption scheme.
Goal G2, concerned with the DRM-restricted availability of printing a legal
form, is the most difﬁcult to satisfy. As noted by the ADLS in their newsletter
(Figure 3), every user of ELF is able to print, through the addition of the ap-
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prevented, it is important that the ADLS continue to inform primary users of
the weaknesses of the PDF format.
Given the design described in this paper, which successfully reproduces the
functionality given by using PDF — the ability to send legal documents to
users with out an ELF installation — it is hoped that users will reduce their
use of PDF. With increased use of the system outlined in this paper, with its
high degree of conﬁdentiality and integrity, it is hoped that any use of PDF
to store or transport ADLS legal forms would be seen as malicious, or at the
least, ill-informed. Given the legal community’s noted [Martin and Marsden,
2003] willingness to report ﬁrms or individuals using obviously unauthorised
hard-copy forms, it is reasonable to assume the same would occur with PDF
forms, especially once informed about the risks inherent in the PDF format.
Goal G2 can only be met for the ADLS if primary users discontinue their use
of PDF.
Goals G3 and G4 are met for both primary and secondary users. The PKI
established during the administered enrolment of primary users enables those
users to encrypt legal forms with the public keys of their intended recipients.
The PKI described has a tightly controlled enrolment process, increasing trust
in the identities of those enrolled. It serves a primary user’s interests to keep
their key pair secret as a third party can use it to create legal documents pur-
porting to come from them. Should a key pair be compromised, revocation is
handled at a central site by the ADLS. This PKI allows the method of legal
form transmission as described in section 3.2, to continue to be used amongst
primary users.
To meet G3 and G4 for transmission between primary and secondary users,
a trust relationship is established between every secondary user with whom a
primary user wishes to communicate. A primary user is then able to encrypt le-
gal forms with the public key of the speciﬁc secondary user to whom they wish
to transmit a legal form. Conﬁdentiality is strictly enforced by the system, as
the private key generated during the secondary user’s NELF widget installation
is never released outside the NGSCB platform by the NELF widget itself.
5.2 Shortcomings
Toﬁnd andevaluateshortcomings, itis possibletoevaluate theinitialthreats
against the new architecture.
As noted in section 5.1, it is currently impossible to restrict the ability to ﬁle.
Despite the ADLS being able to collect a single charge for any form printed
to ﬁle, this ﬁle (in PDF, PS or PCL format) can then be used to generate any
number of hard copies. It should be noted that once in any of these formats,
threats T2 (creation of electronic template), T3 (modiﬁcation of legalese) and
T4 (modiﬁcation of user-modiﬁable ﬁelds) cannot be mitigated. However, ifConclusion 19
theADLSissuccessfulincreatinganaversiontousinganyformatofelectronic
form transmission other than the NELF system described, these threats can be
reduced. For example, all the noted threats from malicious third parties will be
reduced, as they will not be able to obtain a copy of any legal form (guaranteed
through attainment of the conﬁdentiality goal). Without access to a copy, none
of the denoted threats can occur from a third party.
The general problem of replay attacks outlined in section 4.4, causing threat
T1 to occur from primary and secondary users, arises because the NGSCB
platform has no form of persistent, secure storage. Discussions with Geoffrey
Strongin, Platform Security Architect for Advanced Micro Devices [Strongin,
2003] revealed that a working group has recently been set up within the Trusted
Computing Group to develop trusted mass storage. Persistent storage that pro-
tects ﬁles stored by an NCA from modiﬁcation or deletion, unless authorised
by that same NCA, would enable a general solution to replay attacks.
Threats T3 and T4, described in section 3.4, are minimized as much as
possible by using a public key encryption standard. If, as hoped, no legal form
is ever released outside a primary user’s NELF installation without encryption,
T3 and T4 from malicious secondary users can be reduced.
It should be noted that the initial release of NGSCB would not allow NELF
to secure printed output. Discussions with Microsoft security staff [Cram and
Kaplan, 2003] indicated that improvements in this area are expected. Such
secure printing will not come directly from Microsoft, but from other vendors
in the printer marketplace. It is hoped that this will allow the restriction of
printed output to a hard copy printer.
The NELF architecture proposed relies on NGSCB to be present on all sys-
tems in the distributed environment. How soon, if ever, that this will occur is
a question that cannot be answered in this paper. As stated in the introduction,
NGSCB is expected to make inroads in the corporate marketplace ﬁrst. As
such, the ability to secure high value legal documents could be one of the killer
applications needed to drive NGSCB uptake.
6. Conclusion
We have introduced Microsoft’s NGSCB technology, and discussed it by
way of a novel metaphor. It is hoped that this metaphor will be useful in ex-
plaining the concepts and architecture of NGSCB to those without a ﬁrm tech-
nical grasp of computer security. Trusted computing represents a fundamental
shift in the way applications may operate, and it brings a number of dangers
and beneﬁts. It is imperative that consumers are able to make informed deci-
sions about their use of the technology.
We have performed a detailed security analysis of an existing software ap-
plication, and shown the source of a number of threats. After discussion with20 Using NGSCB to Mitigate Existing Software Threats
relevant parties, we have arrived at a number of security goals. A system ar-
chitecture was then developed to meet these goals, through mitigation of the
noted threats. We have shown it is possible to reduce various security threats
to an existing application by way of integration with Microsoft’s NGSCB.
Such integration illustrates that it is possible to redesign an existing appli-
cation to make use of the new security primitives provided by NGSCB, with-
out being forced to redesign completely, discarding the existing usability and
strengths of an application.
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